Feeling Insecure-A State View of Whether Investors in Municipal General Obligation Bonds Have a Mere Promise to Pay or a Binding Obligation by Pollard, Randle B.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2592727 
19
FEELING INSECURE—A STATE VIEW OF WHETHER 
INVESTORS IN MUNICIPAL GENERAL OBLIGATION 
BONDS HAVE A MERE PROMISE TO PAY  
OR A BINDING OBLIGATION 
Randle B. Pollard† 
ABSTRACT 
The City of Detroit's filing for municipal bankruptcy in July, 
2013, has added to a continuing controversy of whether general 
obligation bondholders have a secured lien.  The City of Detroit 
claimed its general obligation bondholders did not have a fully 
secured lien because the law of the state of Michigan did not 
create a statutory lien.  Without the creation of a lien by state law, 
during the insolvency or bankruptcy of municipalities, general 
obligation bondholders will potentially have a mere promise to pay 
versus a binding obligation to pay, and therefore, will not have a 
secured lien.  Treating otherwise secured general obligation bonds 
as unsecured will create more risk for investors and increase the 
cost of borrowing for cities.  This article discusses the treatment of 
general obligation bonds in recent municipal bankruptcies; 
identifies the states that create a binding obligation to pay general 
obligation bondholders; describes problems of not treating general 
obligation bonds as secured; and proposes that states create clear 
laws that grant statutory liens for general obligation bondholders. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The filing for municipal bankruptcy by the City of Detroit in 
July, 2013, has added to the continuing controversy of whether 
general obligation bondholders have a secured lien.  The City of 
Detroit claimed its general obligation bondholders did not have a 
fully secured lien because the law of the state of Michigan did not 
create a statutory lien.1  Without the creation of a lien by state law, 
                                                                                                             
1 See infra Part III.A (detailing Detroit's claim). 
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during the insolvency or bankruptcy of municipalities, general 
obligation bondholders will have a promise to pay versus a binding 
obligation to pay, and therefore, will not have a secured lien.2  The 
City of Detroit's position—along with recent municipal 
bankruptcies in Vallejo, California; Jefferson County, Alabama; 
Stockton, California; and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania—has general 
obligation bondholders receiving less than 100 percent of their 
investments and deemed as unsecured creditors.3  These 
bankruptcies raise an important issue: how secure are general 
obligation pledges?  General obligation bonds, like other municipal 
bonds, are exempt from federal taxation on the interest earned on 
their issuance.4  However, they differ from other types of 
municipal bonds because they typically involve the issuing 
government entity pledging its "full faith and credit"—its ability to 
levy and collect taxes to secure and pay the debt service of the 
bonds.5  Without the creation of a lien by state law, as the City of 
Detroit claimed, during a municipality's financial distress or 
bankruptcy, general obligation bondholders will have merely the 
municipality's promise to pay, rather than its binding obligation to 
pay.6  Consequently, general obligation bondholders may only 
receive a percentage of their investment.  Without a binding 
obligation to pay, investors in general obligation bonds will 
demand higher yields to mitigate their risk.  Paying higher yields 
increases the cost of borrowing for municipalities and may 
                                                                                                             
2 Caitlin Devitt, When Chapter 9 and General Obligations Collide, THE 
BOND BUYER, June 26, 2014, http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/
when-chapter-9-and-general-obligations-collide-1063845-1.html (describing the 
dilemma of general obligation bondholders when they are treated as unsecured 
creditors in a Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy). 
3 See Bondholders Losing Ground in City Bankruptcies, GOVERNING.COM 
(Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.governing.com/news/headlines/gov-bondholders-
losing-ground-in-muni-bankruptcies.html (noting that bondholders can receive 
"as little as 50 cents on the dollar" and highlighting municipal bankruptcies in 
Alabama, California, and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania). 
4 See infra Part II.A for more information about municipal bonds and 
general obligation bonds. 
5 Id. 
6 See id. (detailing Detroit's claim). 
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jeopardize bond financing of essential public services and 
infrastructure. 
This Article examines the treatment of general obligation 
bondholders during the bankruptcy of a municipality.  Part II 
defines general obligation bonds and distinguishes characteristics 
of true general obligation bonds that are binding obligations to pay, 
from general fund securities that are tantamount to mere promises 
to pay the municipality's debt.  Part III reviews the Detroit 
bankruptcy and other recent municipal bankruptcies in the context 
of describing the treatment of holders of general obligation bonds. 
Part IV contains a state by state review of a state's statutory lien 
provisions or relevant state constitutional protections that create 
secured liens for general obligation bondholders.  Part V explores 
the reaction of the municipal bond market and municipal bond 
issuers to the treatment of general obligation bondholders by 
municipalities that recently filed bankruptcy.  Lastly, this Article 
concludes with a discussion of the challenges of general obligation 
bondholders in future municipal bankruptcies and proposes that 
states create clear laws that grant statutory liens for general 
obligation bondholders. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS 
A.  Definition 
Municipal bonds are debt obligations issued by a state, local 
government, agency, or appointed government entity granted the 
authority to issue debt, to finance public purpose projects.7 Public 
purpose projects include roads, airports, hospitals, affordable 
housing, and public purpose programs.8  The interest earned on 
municipal bonds is generally exempt from federal taxation.9  
                                                                                                             
7 JOEL A MINTZ, RONALD H. ROSENBEG & LARRY A. BAKKEN, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL FINANCE 1 (2010); JUDY WESALO TEMEL, THE 
FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS, xv-xvi (5th ed. 2001). 
8 TEMEL, supra note 7, at xv. 
9 28 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012). However, certain taxpayers may be subject to 
alternative minimum tax based on their taxable income. 26 U.S.C. §§ 55-59 
(2012). 
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Nonetheless, municipal bonds are not tax-exempt if the proceeds 
from the issuance are used for private, non-governmental uses or 
are used by the issuer to invest in higher yielding securities.10  
Thus state and local governments can borrow money at lower 
interest rates because exempting interest on state and local bonds 
increases the after-tax yield on the bonds,11  allowing state and 
local bond issuers to pay lower interest rates to bondholders.12 
There are several types of municipal bonds; however, the two 
most common are revenue and general obligation bonds.13  These 
types of bonds are distinguishable by how the repayment of 
principal and interest of the bonds is secured by the issuer.14  
Revenue bonds are bonds secured by a specific revenue stream 
aside from ad valorem taxes and do not involve the issuer pledging 
its "full faith and credit" power.15  General obligations are payable 
and secured by the general funds of the government entity issuer.16  
                                                                                                             
10 28 U.S.C. § 103(b)(1)-(2). Private activity bonds are bonds where more 
than 10% of the bond proceeds are used by a non-governmental person in a trade 
or business and either more than 10% of the payment on the debt service is 
derived from a private trade or business or more than 10% of the security for the 
payment of the bonds is private property. Arbitrage bonds are bonds where the 
proceeds of the issuance are used by the issuer to invest in higher yielding 
bonds. 
11 See generally TEMEL, supra note 7, at 27, 133 (discussing the advantages 
of tax exemption, which allows investors to accept lower yields); see also 
ROBERT DOTY, BLOOMBERG VISUAL GUIDE TO MUNICIPAL BONDS, Ch. 1 
(Bloomberg Press 2012), available at http://my.safaribooksonline.com/book/
personal-investing/9781118152553. 
12 See generally TEMEL, supra note 7, at 27, 133; see also DOTY, supra 
note 11, at Ch. 9 (providing an example of how state and local governments 
issue tax exempt bonds at lower yields than taxable securities). 
13 TEMEL, supra note 7, at 33. 
14 Id. 
15 See id. at 58-59 (discussing ad valorem taxes as property taxes and the 
six types of revenue bonds: utilities, health care, higher education, housing, 
transportation, and industrial development); see also Glossary of Municipal 
Securities Terms: Revenue Bond, MSRB.ORG, http://www.msrb.org/Glossary/
Definition/revenue-bond.aspx (last accessed Jan. 20, 2015). 
16 TEMEL, supra note 7, at 33; Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms: 
General Obligation Bond or GO Bond, MSRB.ORG, http://www.msrb.org/
Glossary/Definition/general-obligation-bond-or-GO-bond.aspx (last accessed 
Jan. 20, 2015). 
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Most general obligation bonds entail a pledge of the issuer's "full 
faith and credit" for the payment of the principal and interest on 
the bonds.17  A pledge of an issuer's full faith and credit requires 
the issuer to seek repayment of the bonds from all sources of 
revenue that the state and local government entity is entitled to 
receive.18  This pledge of the issuer's full faith and credit, however, 
may be an unlimited or limited pledge.19 Unlimited tax general 
obligation bonds, known as UTGO bonds, require the issuer to 
levy and collect ad valorem taxes to pay the debt service.20  
Limited tax general obligation bonds, known as LTGO bonds, 
limit the obligation of the issuer—generally through the bond 
terms, state statute, or state constitution—in order to levy taxes and 
pay the bond.21  Both LTGO and UTGO bonds are generally 
considered safe and secure investments by investors.22 
B.  General Obligation Bonds vs. General Fund Securities 
What type of municipal debt is a bond, and further, what type 
of bond is considered a general obligation bond?  The question is 
relevant to understanding the potential treatment of bondholders 
and investors in general fund securities during a municipal 
bankruptcy.  It is easy to confuse general obligation bonds with 
general fund securities since both use the word "general" in their 
titles,23 and both involve debt issued by a state or local government 
entity.24  Nonetheless, that is where the similarities end.  To 
                                                                                                             
17 TEMEL, supra note 7, at 33. 
18 Id. at 55-56. 
19 Id. (discussing the distinction between "full faith and credit" and "faith 
and credit"). 
20 Id. at 56 (unlimited refers to the tax rate or the amount); DOTY, supra 
note 11, at Ch. 3. 
21 TEMEL, supra note 7, at 56. 
22 Robert Doty, The Diversity of Municipal Bonds and What You Need to 
Know About Risks, AAII JOURNAL (May 2012), http://www.aaii.com/journal/
article/the-diversity-of-municipal-bonds-and-what-you-need-to-knowabout-
risks?adv=yes (referring to Municipal Market Advisor data that states the recent 
default rate of traditional general obligation bonds is only 0.01%). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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illustrate the difference, the key characteristics are grouped as 
followed:25 
1. Structure 
Municipal bonds are typically structured as bonds—a debt of 
state and local governments.26  General securities typically are 
participations in financing such as lease obligations and certificates 
of participation.27 
2. Security 
General obligation bonds are secured by a pledge of taxes; 
levy and collection of ad valorem taxes or state legislature 
appropriations.28  General securities are simply payable from a 
state or local government's general fund.29  The general fund of a 
state local government is an unrestricted fund used to pay certain 
obligations.30 
3. Debt Repayment 
Debt repayment on general obligation bonds is made by the 
issuer levying and collecting taxes to pay the debt service, in 
accordance with the issuer's pledge to do so.31  For general 
securities, the issuer appropriates money from general fund to 
make payments on the debt.32 
                                                                                                             
25 Id.; see generally, DOTY, supra note 11, at Ch. 4 (comparing and 
contrasting the differences between general obligation bonds and general 
obligation securities). 
26 Doty, supra note 22. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 DOTY, supra note 11, at 44. 
31 Doty, supra note 22. 
32 Id. 
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4. Public Role 
General obligation bonds require voter approval, whereas 
general securities do not require public approval.33 
5. State Enforcement 
The payment of general obligation bonds is enforceable by tax 
levy.34  State courts can enforce the issuers' obligations to raise, 
levy, and collect obligated taxes through a writ of mandamus or 
other pleading.35  State law enforcement for general securities is 
limited to specific terms of agreement to pay and appropriate 
funds.36 
6. Bankruptcy Protection 
The treatment of general obligation bondholders depends on 
whether the state grants a statutory lien or state constitutional 
protection.37  General security holders have no special creditor 
status and are treated as unsecured creditors.38 
III.  MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCIES AND GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS 
A.  Detroit 
For several years the City of Detroit ( the "City" or "Detroit") 
dealt with a declining population, a high unemployment rate, and a 
shrinking tax base.39 In May 2013, Detroit "deferred approximately 
                                                                                                             
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 DOTY, supra note 11, at 46. 
36 Doty, supra note 22. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Yu Peng Lin, The Fall of Detroit: A Financial Economist's Point of 
View, 6 INT'L J. ECON. & FIN. 43, 43 (2014) (providing an economic history of 
Detroit that resulted in its current bankruptcy); In re City of Detroit, Mich. (In re 
Detroit), 504 B.R. 97, 119 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013).  In ruling on Detroit's 
ability to file Chapter 9 Bankruptcy under Michigan law, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 
Steven Rhodes reviewed "The Causes and Consequences of the City's Financial 
Distress." Id. 
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$54 million in pension contributions" and planned to defer another 
$50 million by the end of June.40  On June 13, 2013, Kevyn Orr, 
the City's state appointed emergency manager, met with 
approximately 150 of the City's major creditors, including 
bondholders and union representatives of City employees and 
retirees, to propose a restructuring plan of debt estimated at over 
$18 billion.41  At the meeting Mr. Orr presented a 134-page 
restructuring proposal to assist the City in meeting its debt 
obligations and avoid bankruptcy.42  The proposal would pay 
secured creditors based on the value of the collateral securing the 
debt, the terms to be negotiated later.43  It would also pay 
unsecured creditors, including underfunded pension liabilities, with 
a share in the proceeds of a new $10 billion bond issuance based 
on each creditor's pro rata share of the total debt.44  After several 
unsuccessful meetings with creditors45 and with the approval of 
Michigan Governor Rick Snyder, Kevyn Orr filed a petition for 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy on behalf of the City on July 18, 2013.46 
                                                                                                             
40 CITY OF DETROIT, PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS, EMERGENCY MANAGER 
REPORTS 8 (June 14, 2013), available at http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals
/0/docs/em/Reports/City%20of%20Detroit%20Proposal%20for%20Creditors1.p
df. 
41 Sarah Cwiek & Mark Brush, Orr's Restructuring Plan Released, 
Historic Meeting with Detroit's Creditors is Underway, MICHIGANRADIO.ORG 
(June 14, 2013), http://michiganradio.org/post/orrs-restructuring-plan-released-
historic-meeting-detroits-creditors-underway; 'We're Tapped Out': Detroit 
Emergency Manager Proposes Plan To Creditors, CBS DETROIT (June 14, 
2013, 4:01 PM), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2013/06/14/detroit-emergency-man
ager-proposes-plan-to-creditors/. 
42 CITY OF DETROIT, supra note 40. 
43 Id. at 101-06. 
44 Id. at 106-09; Mike Cherney, Pension Bonds Raise Red Flags on Munis, 
WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2013, 4:51 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat
/2013/07/24/pension-bonds-raise-red-flags-on-munis/. 
45 See Bankruptcy Petition at 15, In re Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (July 18, 2013) 
(No. 13-53846) (written approval of bankruptcy filing from Michigan Governor, 
Rick Snyder, noting the failure to reach a restructuring agreement with creditors 
"[d]espite Mr. Orr's best efforts"), available at http://www.freep.com/assets/
freep/pdf/C4208687718.pdf. 
46 Supra note 45; Detroit Bankruptcy Time Line, DETROIT FREE PRESS 
(July 14, 2014, 2:36 PM), http://www.freep.com/article/20140713/NEWS01
/307130100. 
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In its petition, Detroit claimed to have over 100,000 creditors, 
and estimated unsecured debt of $11.9 billion and secured debt of 
$6.4 billion, totaling over $18 billion.47  The $18 billion of debt is 
comprised of $5.7 billion of pension benefits for public employee 
retirees, $3.5 billion in unfunded pension liabilities, approximately 
$2 billion in certificate of participation (COP)48 financing for 
pension liability, $1.01 billion of general fund obligations, $6.4 
billion of obligations secured by special revenue or assets, and 
$300 million in other debt.49  The City included $469.1 million 
general obligation bonds and $5.7 billion of pension benefit 
liability as unsecured debt.50  The $18 billion of debt denotes 
Detroit's bankruptcy as the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. 
history.51 
The filing of the petition for bankruptcy did not occur without 
controversy, and many creditors filed objections on several 
grounds.52 On December 3, 2013, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven 
Rhodes ruled that Detroit was eligible for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.53  
                                                                                                             
47 In re Detroit 504 B.R. at 113. 
48 Id. at 113-14. A certificate of participation (COP) is an arrangement 
among investors, by which they purchase certificates entitling them to a share of 
incoming revenue, typically revenue generated by lease payments. JUDY 
WESALO TEMEL, THE BOND MKT. ASS'N, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL 
BONDS 57 (5th ed. 2001). 
49 CITY OF DETROIT, supra note 40, at 23, 25-26. 
50 Id. at 23-26. (detailing that as of 2011, pension benefits to the Health and 
Life Insurance Benefit Plan and the Supplemental Death Benefit Plan for 
retirees totaled $5.7 billion; unfunded pension obligations $3.5 billion; general 
obligation bonds $651 million; COP related to pensions $1.43 billion; swap 
contract liabilities related to the COPs $346.6 million; and other liabilities $300 
million). 
51 In re Detroit, 504 B.R. at 178; Lin, supra note 39. 
52 In re Detroit, 504 B.R. at 110. A full detail of the objections and motions 
against the bankruptcy petition is beyond the scope of this article. For such 
included state constitutional arguments regarding Detroit's ability to file, see 
Flowers v. Snyder, No. 13-729-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. filed July 3, 2013) and 
Webster v. Snyder, No. 13-734-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. filed July 3, 2013) (both 
lawsuits tried to enjoin the City from filing Chapter 9 bankruptcy and impairing 
pension claims).  For a similar challenge to Detroit's filing for bankruptcy see 
General Retirement System of the City of Detroit v. Orr, No. 13-768-CZ (Mich. 
Cir. Ct. filed July 17, 2013). 
53 In re Detroit, 504 B.R. at 190. 
2015] FEELING INSECURE 29 
Judge Rhodes also ruled that pension claims are unsecured debt, 
potentially giving the claims of general obligation bondholders 
priority over pension fund claims.54  Shortly after Judge Rhodes' 
ruling, on February 21, 2014, the City filed its reorganization plan 
or "Plan of Adjustment" (the "Plan") to pay its creditors pursuant 
to the bankruptcy filing.55  A major element of the Plan was to treat 
secured general obligation bonds as unsecured.56 
With the unsecured debt classification, the City would pay a 
small percentage of this outstanding debt, potentially twenty cents 
per dollar of the debt.57  By declaring the UTGO bonds as 
unsecured in its Plan,58  the City could use revenues currently 
pledged to these bonds to secured newly issued water and sewer 
                                                                                                             
54 Id. at 149-51 ("[C]hapter 9 permits the State of Michigan to authorize a 
city to file a petition for chapter 9 relief without explicitly providing for the 
protection of accrued pension benefits."); see also Daniel Fisher, Detroit 
Bankruptcy Ruling Good News For Muni Bonds, Insurers, FORBES (Dec. 4, 
2013, 3:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013/12/04/detroit-
bankruptcy-ruling-good-news-for-muni-bonds-insurers/. For a discussion about 
whether pension fund claims should have greater priority than municipal bonds, 
see Adam Santeusanio, Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2014: II. 
In re Detroit: Consequences of Detroit's Bankruptcy for Pensioners, 33 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 430, 433-34 (Spring 2014) (discussing potential strategies 
for Detroit pensioners and the impact of Judge Rhode's ruling on pensioners in 
other municipalities).  For a discussion about Judge Rhodes ruling's impact on 
Detroit pensions and reforms to municipal financing and debt to prevent future 
municipal bankruptcies see Christine Sgarlata Chung, Zombieland / The Detroit 
Bankruptcy: Why Debts Associated with Pensions, Benefits, and Municipal 
Securities Never Die . . . and How They are Killing Cities Like Detroit, 41 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 771, 817, 842 (Mar. 2014). 
55 Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit, In re Detroit, 
504 B.R. 97 (Feb. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Detroit Plan], available at 
http://www.freep.com/assets/freep/pdf/C4218951221.PDF. 
56 Id. at 30-31, 97.  Note however, that the Plan did not address the City's 
shrinking tax base with regard to general obligation bonds. 
57 Anne VanderMey & Nicolas Rapp, Detroit Proposes a Lose-Lose 
Bankruptcy Plan, FORTUNE (Feb. 22, 2014, 3:36 AM), http://fortune.com
/2014/02/22/detroit-proposes-a-lose-lose-bankruptcy-plan/. 
58 Detroit Plan, supra note 55, at 28. 
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bonds, the proceeds of which would be used to pay all unsecured 
creditors.59 
The outstanding general obligation bond debt is comprised of 
$469.1 million of unlimited tax general obligation bonds and 
$540.3 million are limited tax general obligation bonds.60  In the 
defined terms section of the Plan, the Plan treats an "Allowed"61 
UTGO bonds as follows: 
[E]ach Holder of an Allowed Unlimited Tax General 
Obligation Bond Claim, in full satisfaction of such 
Allowed Claim, shall receive its Pro Rata share of 
Plan . . . . The Plan UTGO Notes shall contain such other 
terms as will result in each Holder of an Allowed 
Unlimited Tax General Obligation Bond Claim receiving 
a payment stream the present value of which is equal to 
approximately 20% of such Holder's Allowed Unlimited 
Tax General Obligation Bond Claim as of the Effective 
Date.62 
The Plan treats LTGO bonds and UTGO bonds the same as 
unsecured debt and offers holders of both 20 percent recovery of 
their outstanding claims.63  In line with its unsecured treatment of 
the UTGO bonds, on October 1, 2013, the City failed to pay a $9.4 
million interest payment to bondholders.64  The missed interest 
payment put the UTGO bonds in default.  If UTGO bondholders 
failed to receive their quarterly interest payments, the issuance is in 
                                                                                                             
59 Matt Wirz & Emily Glazer, Detroit Bankruptcy: Bond Insurers Made 
Last Ditch Counterproposal to No Avail, WALL ST. J. (June 19, 2013, 6:20 PM) 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/07/19/detroit-bankruptcy-bond-insurers-
made-last-ditch-counterproposal-to-no-avail/. 
60 CITY OF DETROIT, supra note 40, at 26. 
61 Detroit Plan, supra note 55, at 2 ("Allowed" is defined as "a Claim, 
proof of which has been timely Filed."). 
62 Id. at 28. 
63 Michael Ide, The Upside to Detroit Muni Bonds, VALUEWALK (Mar. 11, 
2014), http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/03/upside-detroit-muni-bonds/. 
64 Karen Pierog & Tom Hals, Detroit Bankruptcy Bond Fight a Watershed 
for Municipal Market, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/02/17/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy-bonds-idUSBREA1G0OJ20140217. 
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default, requiring insurers of the bond issuances to make the 
interest payments.  Nationally, only 2 percent of $5 trillion general 
obligation bonds issued have ever defaulted.65  After Detroit 
defaulted on the UTGO bonds, bond insurers National Public 
Finance Guarantee Corp., the public finance subsidiary of MBIA 
Inc., and Assured Guaranty Municipal Corp. together filed a 
lawsuit, and Ambac Assurance Corp. also filed a separate suit.66  
Both lawsuits claimed that the City violated Michigan law by using 
property taxes pledged to secure the bonds for its operating 
expenses.67 The bond insurers sought summary judgment from 
Judge Rhodes to force the City to (1) set aside property tax revenue 
to make the bond payments and, (2) restrict the City from using tax 
revenue earmarked for the payment of the bonds for future 
financing.68 Detroit responded to the lawsuits by claiming its 
pledge to repay the bonds was a promise under state law, and 
likened it to a " 'promise,' as in 'I pledge allegiance to the flag.' "69 
For several weeks Judge Rhodes considered the issue of 
treating UTGO bonds as unsecured debt.70  In the meantime, the 
City and the bond insurers were able to mediate a settlement before 
Judge Rhodes ruled on the issue.71  The parties agreed the UTGO 
bondholders' claim would be secured and paid in the amount of 
$388 million, of which $287.5 million (approximately 74 percent) 
                                                                                                             
65 Arthur R. O'Keefe, Muni Bond Defaults, Bankruptcies and Bondholder 
Protections, BNY MELLON (June 30, 2013), http://www.bnymellon
wealthmanagement.com/our-views/perspectives/muni-bond-defaults.html. 
66 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Order, In re Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 
(Nov. 13, 2013) (No. 13-53846) 2013 WL 6331931 [hereinafter Joint 
Compliant]; Complaint of Ambac Assurance Corp. for Declaratory Judgment & 
Order In re Detroit, 504 B.R. 97 (Nov. 8. 2014) (No. 13-53846). 
67 Joint Compliant, supra note 66, ¶6. 
68 See id. at 26-28; see also Pierog & Hals, supra note 64. 
69 Pierog & Hals, supra note 64. 
70 Detroit Bankruptcy Time Line, supra note 46. 
71 See Nathan Bomey, Detroit Bankruptcy Bond Deal Frees up $56M for 
Pensioners, Orr Says, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.freep
.com/article/20140409/NEWS01/304090081/Detroit-bondholders-bankruptcy-
settlement-Kevyn-Orr-Gerald-Rosen. 
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would be treated as secured debt.72  The City's Plan and its 
amended disclosure statement were further amended to reflect the 
mediated agreement.73  The underlying legal arguments of the 
parties were not addressed in the mediation.74 
B. Other Recent Municipal Bankruptcies 
Prior to Detroit, recent municipal bankruptcies have had 
similar issues regarding the priority rights of municipal 
bondholders.75  Municipal bondholders in bankruptcies in Vallejo 
and Stockton, California; Jefferson County, Alabama; and 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania were all treated as having unsecured debt 
in bankruptcy restructuring plans.76  However, only the City of 
Harrisburg, whose bankruptcy petition was dismissed and 
restructured its debt outside of bankruptcy, involved UTGO 
bonds.77  In the remaining bankruptcies, bondholders held general 
fund securities.78  General fund securities, unlike LTGO and 
UTGO bonds, do not involve a pledge of specific tax revenue and 
are treated as unsecured creditors in bankruptcy.79 
1. Vallejo 
Since the early 2000s, the City of Vallejo had struggled to 
maintain a balanced budget in part due to lavish salaries and 
                                                                                                             
72 Third Amended Disclosure Statement with Respect to Third Amended 
Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit at 32, 98, In re Detroit, 
504 B.R. 97 (filed April 25, 2014) [hereinafter Third Amended Disclosure]. 
73 Id at 61, 98; see also Chad Halcom, Detroit Agrees to Pay Bondholders 
74% on $388M Claim in Bankruptcy, CRAIN'S DETROIT BUSINESS (Apr. 9, 
2014), http://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20140409/news/140409839/detroit-
agrees-to-pay-bondholders-74-on-388m-claim-in-bankruptcy. 
74 Third Amended Disclosure, supra note 72, at i-vii; see also In re Detroit, 
504 B.R. at 108-10. 
75 See Bondholders Losing Ground in City Bankruptcies, supra note 3 
(noting that bondholders can receive "as little as 50 cents on the dollar" and 
highlighting municipal bankruptcies in Alabama, California, and Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania). 
76 Id. 
77 See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 
78 See infra notes 81-100 and accompanying text. 
79 See supra notes 20-38 and accompanying text. 
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pension benefits paid to police and firefighters, which led to a $16 
million shortfall.80  The City spent 74 percent of its $80 million 
general fund budget on public safety employee salaries and 
benefits.81 The City filed bankruptcy on May 23, 2008.82  In its 
bankruptcy restructuring plan, the City defaulted on general fund 
lease securities and holders of these securities received 25 percent 
of their investment.83 
2. Jefferson County 
Jefferson County, Alabama, the county for which the City of 
Birmingham is the county seat, filed for bankruptcy on November 
9, 2011.84  Jefferson County's $4.2 billion in debt made it the 
largest municipal bankruptcy prior to Detroit's bankruptcy.85  The 
majority of the debt, $3.14 billion, was for sewer revenue bonds 
and included general obligation bonds.86  In April, 2012, the 
County defaulted on the general obligation bonds,87 but unlike the 
general obligation bonds in the Detroit bankruptcy, these bonds 
were not UTGO bonds but constituted general obligation 
                                                                                                             
80 Carolyn Jones, Vallejo Votes to Declare Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (May 7, 2008), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea
/article/Vallejo-votes-to-declare-Chapter-9-bankruptcy-3285168.php; see also 
Steven Greenhut, Vallejo's Painful Lessons in Municipal Bankruptcy, WALL  
ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870
3625304575115551578762006. 
81 Jones, supra note 80. 
82 City of Vallejo, Cal., Voluntary Petition for Bankruptcy, In re City of 
Vallejo, 408 B.R. 280 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009). 
83 CITY OF VALLEJO BANKRUPTCY WORKOUT PLAN at B-9, I-5 (Dec. 22, 
2009); Doty, supra note 22. 
84 Jefferson County, Ala., Voluntary Petition for Bankruptcy, In re 
Jefferson County, Ala., 484 B.R. 427 (Nov. 9, 2011). 
85 See Martin Z. Braun, Jefferson County's Bankruptcy Left Few Winners, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 23, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-11-
22/jefferson-county-s-bankruptcy-left-few-winners-as-debt-forgiven.html. 
86 MICHAEL MARZ & ANGELA KUKODA, FIRSTSOUTHWEST (WHITE PAPER), 
RECENT BANKRUPTCIES AND DEFAULTS RAISE CONCERNS OVER GENERAL 
OBLIGATION BONDS 1 (June 2012), available at http://www.munibondsfor
america.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/First-SW-White-Paper-Muni-
Bankruptcies-and-GO-Bonds-June-2012.pdf. 
87 Id. 
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warrants.88  The warrants were payable out of the County's general 
fund, and there was "no specific lien on an asset or tax revenue 
stream."89 
3. Stockton 
In 2012, the City of Stockton owed $700 million to over fifty 
creditors due to high pension retiree costs, a failed downtown 
revitalization project, and reduced property tax revenue because of 
a real estate downturn.90  The City filed bankruptcy on June 28, 
2012.91  Holders of general fund securities received 45 percent of 
their investment in the bankruptcy restructuring.92  The largest 
creditor was Assured Guaranty, the bond insurer of the general 
fund securities.93 
4. Harrisburg 
In 2004, the City of Harrisburg issued a series of UTGO bonds 
to retrofit a trash incinerator that had been closed by federal 
environmental regulators.94  By the end of 2006, the renovation 
had failed, and the facility was losing approximately $1 million a 
                                                                                                             
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Bobby White, Stockton Files for Bankruptcy Protection, WALL ST. J. 
(June 29, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304
058404577495412282335228; see also Scott C. Pryor, Fairness and Risk in 
Stockton: Pensions, Bonds, and Taxes—When Doing Nothing is Doing Well, at 
6-8 (July 23, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2297478. 
91 In re City of Stockton, Cal. (In re Stockton), 478 B.R. 8, 14 (Bankr. E.D. 
Cal. 2012). 
92 Bondholders Losing Ground in City Bankruptcies, supra note 3. 
93 Id. 
94 See generally John Buntin, Harrisburg's Failed Infrastructure Project, 
GOVERNING.COM (Nov. 2010), http://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-
infrastructure/Harrisburgs-failed-infrastructure-project.html (discussing how in 
2004 Harrisburg issued $120 million in new debt in order to retrofit its 
incinerator facility for environmental purposes, rather than choosing to sell the 
incinerator and take a loss on a facility for which the city still owed $104 
million). 
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month.95  The City had over $280 million in outstanding UTGO 
bonds, and by December of 2010, the City had failed to pay debt 
service on the bonds.96  The City petitioned the state for a 
designation of "financial distress" and subsequently filed Chapter 9 
bankruptcy on October 8, 2011.97  The City failed to make a $5.3 
million debt service payment on the UTGO bonds on March 15, 
2012, and the bond insurer Assured sued.98  The City's bankruptcy 
petition was dismissed by the federal bankruptcy court.99  The City 
restructured its debt, which led UTGO bondholders to take a 
"haircut" of approximately 40 percent.100 
IV.  AFTER DETROIT—PROMISE VERSES OBLIGATION 
A.  Are General Obligation Bonds Secured by Lien? 
The mediated settlement between the City of Detroit and bond 
insurers has not resolved the issue of whether Michigan law creates 
a pledge of the full faith and credit of municipality issuing UTGO 
bonds and not merely a promise to pay. Further, the lack of a 
ruling on Michigan law leaves open the pledge or promise issue 
                                                                                                             
95 Id. 
96 Cate Long, A Harrisburg Scorecard, REUTERS (Oct 14, 2011), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/muniland/2011/10/14/a-harrisburg-scorecard/; Romy 
Varghese, Assured Guaranty, TD Bank Slap Harrisburg With Suit, WALL ST. J., 
Sept 14, 2010, at C4 (describing the lawsuit against Harrisburg initiated by 
Assured Guaranty, the bond insurer). 
97 In re City of Harrisburg (In re Harrisburg), 465 B.R. 744, 749-50, 752 
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011); see Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in 
Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 403, 474 (2014) (discussing 
the events leading up to Harrisburg's filing for bankruptcy). 
98 MARZ & KUKODA, supra note 86, at 3; Nick Malawskey, Harrisburg 
Incinerator Contractors Haven't Been Paid, PENNLIVE (July 20, 2012, 5:48 
AM), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2012/07/harrisburg_inci
nerator_contrac.html. 
99 Mary Walsh Williams & Jon Hurdle, Harrisburg Sees Path to 
Restructuring Debts Without Bankruptcy Filing, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2013, at 
A12. 
100 See generally Bondholders Losing Ground in City Bankruptcies, supra 
note 3 (explaining that in bankruptcy trials bondholders could recover as little as 
50 cents on the dollar for defaulted municipal bonds in cities such as 
Harrisburg). 
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unresolved.  Regardless of the interpretation of Michigan law, the 
City of Detroit was still able to force bond issuers to negotiate 
concessions on the debt owed to UTGO bondholders by treating 
UTGO bonds as unsecured debt.101  Will UTGO bondholders ever 
feel really secure when buying debt of economically distressed 
cities, especially when state law regarding the establishment of a 
lien is unclear?102 
Notwithstanding the negotiating techniques of an 
economically distressed city during a municipal bankruptcy, 
bondholders must determine if state law, either implied or 
expressly, created a statutory lien, or if a lien was created in the 
enacting legislation that authorized the bond issuance, or lastly if 
the state's constitution created a lien.103  Without such assurance, 
investors will ask for higher yields on the investments to counter 
the increased risk.104  James E. Spiotto, a bankruptcy attorney with 
Chapman and Cutler LLP and coauthor of a book entitled 
Municipalities in Distress?,105 stated that "whether general-
obligation bonds or other types of muni debt are protected depends 
on the language of the state law."106 
                                                                                                             
101 See Steven Malanga, Detroit's Message to Investors: There Will be 
Blood, CITY JOURNAL (Spring 2014), http://www.city-journal.org/2014/24
_2_snd-detroit-bankruptcy.html ("Orr used the unprecedented threat of treating 
general obligation bonds like unsecured debt . . . which prompted the backers of 
those bonds to agree to significant concessions . . . ."). 
102 Coming to a reasonable conclusion, this author answers in the negative. 
Id. ("[G]eneral-obligation municipal bonds will never quite feel as secure as they 
once were . . . ."). 
103 See PETER HAYES & JAMES SCHWARTZ, BLACKROCK INC., DISTRESS IN 
DETROIT: A BLACKROCK ANALYSIS 3 (2013) ("[A lien] effectively provides GO 
bondholders a priority lien on revenues for the full and timely payment of debt 
service in cases of local government distress, including bankruptcy."), available 
at https://www.blackrock.com/cash/literature/whitepaper/distress-in-detroit-a-
blackrock-analysis.pdf. 
104 MARZ & KUKODA, supra note 86, at 7. 
105 JAMES E. SPIOTTO, ANN E. ACKER & LAURA E. APPLEBY, 
MUNICIPALITIES IN DISTRESS? HOW STATES AND INVESTORS DEAL WITH LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL EMERGENCIES (1st ed. 2012). 
106 Kelley Nolan, On 'General Obligation' Munis, Investors Advise 
Caution, WALL. ST. J. (May 17, 2012) (featuring Mr. Spiotto's response when 
asked about the protection afforded to holders of general obligation bonds 
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B.  State by State Review of Statutory Liens 
Determining whether an issuer of general obligation bonds has 
a binding obligation to repay the debt service on the bonds would 
appear to be simply a matter of a reviewing state statute.  However, 
only five states—California,107 Colorado,108 Florida,109 
Louisiana,110 and Rhode Island111—have state laws that expressly 
grant general obligation bondholders a statutory lien with a binding 
obligation.  A statutory lien grants the bondholders of UTGO 
bonds a first priority to ad valorem taxes and other tax revenues.112 
Analysts of Moody's Investor Service are currently doing a fifty-
state analysis of state government general obligation pledges.113  
Their analysis also distinguishes states with UTGOs and 
LTGOs.114  In the attached Appendix A, a chart of all fifty states 
provides how each state treats a general obligation bond and 
whether it is a secured lien or not. 
V.  EFFECT OF REQUIRING STATUTORY LIENS ON GENERAL 
OBLIGATION BONDS 
A.  State Reaction 
Even before the Detroit bankruptcy, the rights of municipal 
bondholders in a municipal financial crisis were put into doubt.115  
For instance, in 2010 the City of Central Falls, Rhode Island, 
declared insolvency due to $80 million in unfunded pension 
liabilities that far exceeded the City's annual budget of $17 
                                                                                                             
during bankruptcy), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000
1424052702303360504577410230458546046. 
107 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8878.25 (West 2014). 
108 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-57-208 (West 2014). 
109 FLA. STAT. § 132.43 (West 2014). 
110 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1402 (2014). 
111 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-12-1 (West 2014). 
112 MARZ & KUKODA, supra note 86, at 1. 
113 See MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICES, MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY: UPDATE 
AND INSIGHTS – GENERAL OBLIGATION SPOTLIGHT (Dec. 5, 2013; Jan. 9, 2014; 
Feb. 6, 2014; Mar. 7, 2014; Apr. 4, 2014). 
114 Id. at 6. 
115 See supra Part III.B. 
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million.116  Central Falls filed Chapter 9 bankruptcy on August 1, 
2011.117  Before the bankruptcy was completed, the Rhode Island 
state legislature hastily passed legislation to protect municipal 
bondholders by providing them with a statutory lien that gave them 
preference over all other creditors and guaranteeing their 
repayment from ad valorem taxes and general municipal revenues 
in the event of bankruptcy.118  This legislation was enacted to 
protect Rhode Island municipalities' ability to issue debt to finance 
projects and to maintain low borrowing costs.119 
Municipalities have an interest in maintaining low borrowing 
rates and in state laws that strengthen and clarify the rights of 
bondholders in a bankruptcy—statutes like that of California, 
Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, and Rhode Island—which help foster 
low borrowing rates.120  The Detroit bankruptcy filing and the 
City's challenging its pledge of full faith and credit for the security 
of UTGO bonds should cause other states to pass similar 
legislation that creates clear statutory liens. 
B.  Reaction by the Bond Market and Investors 
The Detroit bankruptcy called into question the priority of 
payments to creditors during municipal debt restructuring from 
municipal bankruptcy.121  Historically, investors generally assumed 
that UTGO bonds investors and pension benefits received the 
highest priority treatment, followed by LTGO bonds, pension 
                                                                                                             
116 See Maria O'Brien Hylton, Central Falls Retirees v. Bondholders: 
Assessing Fear of Contagion in Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 525, 
525-26 (Fall 2013); see also MARZ & KUKODA, supra note 86, at 4. 
117 Hylton, supra note 116, at 525. 
118 Id. at 526-27; see also James E. Spiotto, The Role of the State in 
Supervising and Assisting Municipalities, Especially in Times of Financial 
Distress, MUN. FIN. J., Winter/Spring 2013, at 12-13 (describing the enactment 
of Rhode Island's statutory lien statute). 
119 Hylton supra note 116, at 527, 559-60 (concluding that municipal 
bondholders should not be granted a priority lien that excludes them from the 
cost of restructuring municipal debt). 
120 See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text. 
121 PIMCO, After Detroit: Rigorous Research and Credit Selection Is the 
Key to Investing in Municipal Bonds, MINYANVILLE.COM (Oct. 3, 2013), 
available at http://www.minyanville.com/articles/print.php?a=52073 
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obligations investment instruments, other general fund claims, and 
lastly retiree healthcare obligations.122 Nevertheless, Detroit's 
challenging the meaning of "pledge" within Michigan's statute has 
caused investment asset managers to recommend that investors 
rethink the assumed priority of debts.123  BlackRock, one of the 
world's largest investment asset managers,124 recently advised 
investors in municipal bonds to consider investing in municipal 
bonds that have dedicated revenue streams, like water and sewer 
revenue bonds.125  Other recommendations advise investors to gain 
awareness of how state law treats UTGO bondholders during 
economic distress or bankruptcy of the local governmental issuer, 
allowing investors to understand the credit risk of a local general 
obligation bond issuance.126 
Preferences for state and local government debt include state 
and local government debt that is issued by states, "high grade" 
local government general obligation debt, local governments in 
state with statutory liens, debt secured by sales or gas tax, and 
essential service revenue-secured debt.127  As stated in Part IV.B, 
five states unquestionably offer statutory liens to UTGO 
bondholders.  To determine if a statutory lien is granted in other 
states, an investor will need to review state statues and 
constitutions.128  It is also important that investors carefully review 
the description of the security of their investment that appears in 
the offering documentation, also known as the official statement, 
to "determine whether a statutory lien is present."129 
                                                                                                             
122 Id. 
123 See generally HAYES & SCHWARTZ, supra note 103 (discussing how 
Detroit's proposal to treat obligations to all bondholders equally shocked 
bondholders and called into question the value of the "full faith and credit" 
pledge bestowed to holders of GO bonds). 
124 Susanne Craig, The Giant of Shareholders, Quietly Stirring, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/business/blackrock-a-
shareholding-giant-is-quietly-stirring.html?pagewanted=all 
125 HAYES & SCHWARTZ, supra note 103 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 See Appendix A for references to all fifty states. 
129 Doty, supra note 22. 
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If investors are uncertain of the security of UTGO bonds, they 
are likely to demand a greater yield on their investment to 
compensate for the increased risk due to the possibility of having 
an investment that is unsecured.130  Higher yields on UTGO bonds 
will increase a state and local government's cost of borrowing.  
Increased borrowing costs may require higher taxes to repay the 
debt, which affects the general public, especially at the local 
government level.131 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Detroit bankruptcy has not resolved the issue of whether 
UTGO bonds in Michigan are secured by pledge of the issuer's full 
faith and credit and not merely a simple promise to pay if state law 
or a state constitution creates a secured lien.  Judge Rhodes did not 
rule on this issue, and the matter was resolved through mediation 
between the City of Detroit and bond insurers.132  A ruling by 
Judge Rhodes would have provided an example to other states on 
how to treat future municipal bond issuance subject to municipal 
bankruptcy.  In future municipal bankruptcies, UTGO bondholders 
should argue that state law creates a secured lien.  If bankruptcy 
courts begin treating UTGO bondholders as unsecured creditors, 
bond issuers may incur more cost in issuance, such as paying 
higher yields on UTGO bonds to mitigate the risk of loss to 
bondholders.  Following the lead of the five states that have clear 
statutory lien laws, other states should create statutory liens for 
UTGO bonds to help shield bondholders from losses in potential 
municipal bankruptcies.  UTGO bond issuers should be reassured 
that their UTGO issuance is indeed secured by the full faith and 
credit of the state and local government issuer. 
                                                                                                             
130 MARZ & KUKODA, supra note 86, at 7. 
131 HAYES & SCHWARTZ, supra note 103, at 4. 
132 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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Appendix  A 
State General Bond 
Protection 
Code Section 
Alabama no ALA. CODE § 11-81-16 (1975)  
Alaska yes ALASKA STAT. § 37.15.180  
Arizona no ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-429  
Arkansas no ARK. CONST. amend . 20  
California yes CAL. GOV. CODE § 5450   
Colorado yes COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-21-106  
Connecticut yes CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-20h  
Delaware yes DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 29 § 7417  
Florida yes FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.70 (West 2014) 
Georgia yes GA. CONST. art. VII, § IV, ¶ 3 
Hawaii no HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 11  
Idaho no ID. CONST. art. VIII, § 1  
Illinois no  65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 85/2 
Indiana no IND. CODE § 5-1.5-4-2 
Iowa no IOWA CODE ANN. § 8.57F   
Kansas yes KAN. STAT. ANN. § 10-1001 
Kentucky no KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45.800 (West 2009)  
Louisiana yes LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39:1402 
Maine yes ME. CONST. art. V, Pt. 3, § 5.  
Maryland no MD. CODE ANN., Fin. & Procurement, § 8-
132  
Massachusetts no MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 29 § 60A   
Michigan yes MICH. CONST. art. IX § 15  
Minnesota no MINN. STAT. § 475A.03  
Mississippi no MISS. CODE ANN. § 31-19-13  
Missouri no MO. CONST. art. 3, § 37 
Montana no MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-7-4262 
Nebraska yes NEB. REV. ST. § 18-2607  
Nevada no NEV. REV. STAT. § 349.072 
New Hampshire yes N.H. REV. STAT. § 33-B:6  
New Jersey yes N.J. STAT .ANN. § 52:27-23.3 (West) 
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New Mexico yes N.M. STAT. ANN. § 6-12-12  
New York no, but statute 
states this does 
not apply to 
NYC 
N.Y. LOCAL FINANCE LAW § 85.40, 85.30 
(McKinney)   
North Carolina no N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 159-176 
North Dakota yes, but only up 
to the amount of 
debt the 
municipality is 
constitutionally 
authorized to 
incur 
N.D. CONST. art. X, § 15; N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 40-35-15 
Ohio no OH CONST. art. VIII, § 3 
Oklahoma no OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 23a 
Oregon yes OR. REV. STAT. § 223.235  
Pennsylvania no 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3919.311 (West) 
Rhode Island yes R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-12-1  
South Carolina no, but there are 
a few projects 
which qualify for 
the protection 
such as schools 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 11-23-10 
South Dakota yes S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-12-35 
Tennessee yes TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-9-202 
Texas no TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 49-j  
Utah yes UTAH CODE ANN. § 11-14-310  
Vermont no VT. STAT. ANN. tit 32, § 951a 
Virginia default is yes, but 
can be changed 
in the security 
instrument 
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4902.1 
Washington yes WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.99I.060 (West) 
West Virginia yes W. VA. CODE, § 13-2A-15 
Wisconsin yes WIS. STAT. ANN. § 18.12 
Wyoming yes but only if 
the city and/or 
town has had the 
bonds guaranteed 
by the state 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-4-1002  
 
 
